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FOREWORD
The authors were invited to prepare a paper for a conference
on Civil-Military Relations in the fall, 1994. That paper was
translated into an article for the Winter, 1995 edition of The
Washington Quarterly under the title "Civil-Military Relations in
the United States: The State of the Debate."
Although the
intensity of interest in this subject has fallen from the front
pages of the newspapers, the authors have here suggested that the
debate needs to continue and that it should start with
identification of the right questions. The basic issues are
inherent in the structure and beliefs of American political
society, but the questions may be changing as the nature of that
society and the manner in which it talks to itself and what it
sees its responsibilities to be are also changing.
While the authors do not see a current crisis in the
relationship, they attempt to explain many of the basic features
of that relationship, providing some of its history along the
way. They have pointed out several conditions which put the
relationship under particular strain and suggest that the
Secretary of Defense is, by virtue of several institutional
peculiarities, at the nexus of the relationship. It is the
author's intent that this study lead to sustained debate within
the military and civilian policy-making communities.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this
monograph to foster debate on this important subject.

WILLIAM W. ALLEN
Colonel, U.S. Army
Acting Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The debate over proper civil-military relationships began
while America was still a collection of British colonies. The
relationship was the subject of intense and acrimonious debate
during the framing of the Constitution and periodically the
debate reemerges. The author feel the relationship exists on two
levels. The first is focused on specific issues and key
individuals and is transitory in nature. The second level deals
with the enduring questionswith essential values. At the latter
level individuals merely represent the issues. Two questions are
addressed in this study: What is the appropriate level of
involvement of the military in national security policymaking?
and Within that context, with what or whom does an officer's
ultimate loyalty lie?
Most Americans agree that the objective is a competent,
professional military able to contribute to national security
policymaking but not to dominate it, but there is no consensus on
the changes that the evolution of the global security environment
will bring, or on the risks of too much military involvement in
policymaking.
The issues that will shape the future such as the changing
nature of armed conflict and alterations in U.S. national
security strategy are clear, but their precise impact on civilmilitary relations is not. There is no crisis in American civilmilitary relations now, but what will happen in a decade or so
when the psychological legacy of the Cold War fully fades and
fundamental assumptions are again open to debate remains to be
seen.
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AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS:
NEW ISSUES, ENDURING PROBLEMS
Introduction.
For Americans, few tasks are more vexing than establishing
the appropriate role of the military in the shaping of national
policy. From the beginning of the Republic, this process has
assumed transcendental importance, reflecting fundamental debates
about the proper distribution of power in a democratic system and
following deep fissures in the polity. Because armed forces are
simultaneously seen as a bulwark of freedom and potential threat
to it, as protector of national values and possible challenger to
them, civil-military relations have been characterized by a
series of precarious compromises, each with a limited lifespan.
Today, the end of the Cold War is forcing another painful
reassessment of the appropriate role of the military in national
policymaking. This is a crucial process for the military:
decisions made now will affect its policymaking role well into
the 21st century.
Major adjustments in civil-military relations are never
easy. The heart of the problem is an enduring tension: to succeed
at warfighting, the military must be distinct in values,
attitudes, procedures, and organization but must, at the same
1
time, represent American society. "America's armed forces,"
Colin Powell writes, "are as much a part of the fabric of U.S.
valuesfreedom, democracy, human dignity, and the rule of law–as
2
any other institutional, cultural or religious thread." The
result of this tension is a mixed, even contradictory, attitude
toward military involvement in policymaking. To the extent the
military is different than the rest of society, there is a
rationale for limiting its involvement in framing policy or even
excluding it altogether. But to the extent the military reflects
and represents society, it should be fully integrated into
policymaking. The only solution is a fragile balance, shifting in
response to changes in the strategic environment.



Tensions, contradictions, and interludes of crisis and
readjustment make American civil-military relations a tumultuous
affair. In daily manifestations of this, officers involved in
policymaking often become frustrated when dealing with civilian
officials. The U.S. military, as Eliot Cohen points out, has a
"persistent preference for excessively neat patterns of civilian3
military relations." Reality seldom obliges. The tendency is to
blame personality, to castigate the inability or unwillingness of
civilian officials to fully grasp the needs and appropriate uses
of the military. Such explanations are myopic. In reality, the
basic structure of American civil-military relations is imbued
with unsolvable problems, perplexing dilemmas, and deliberate
inefficiencies, all reflecting the deeper intricacies of the
American political system. The military's frustration is both
intentional and necessary. Knowing this–and understanding its
historic background–can help officers play a constructive role in
the ongoing transformation to a post-Cold War national security
policymaking process.

First Principle: Civilian Control.
The relationship of the uniformed military and civilian
policymakers in the United States is complex and fluid, but is
based on a single principle: civilian control. All other facets
of the relationship reflect this or are designed to assure it.
Like most first principles, this one has become sacrosanct and is
seldom scrutinized, but as civil-military relations are adapted
to the late 20th century, it would be useful to reexamine the
notion of civilian control. Why is it the foundation on which all
else is built?
Support for civilian control initially emerged from the
American interpretation of European history. Most of the Founding
Fathers accepted the Radical Whig notion that standing armed
4
forces invariably became a tool of tyranny. Liberty and a
powerful military were considered antithetical; only citizen
soldiers could provide national defense without threatening
political freedom. Richard H. Kohn explains:
Few political principles were more widely known or more
universally accepted in America during the 1780s than
the danger of standing armies in peacetime. Because of



its arms, its isolation from society, its discipline,
and its loyalty and obedience to its commander, an army
could not necessarily be controlled by law or
constitution. An army represented the ultimate in
power, capable, even when it did not attempt a coup on
its own, of becoming the instrument by which others
could terrorize a population, seize power, or
5
perpetuate tyranny.
This posed a dilemma for the Founding Fathers. Facing
threats in every direction, whether Indians, British, French,
Spanish, pirates, or internal rebellion, the United States needed
military strength. On the other hand, memories were fresh of
repression at the hands of Redcoats and Hessians. Amid intense
debate and calls to ban a standing army altogether, the framers
of the Constitution crafted a compromise between military
effectiveness and political control. They trusted balance, the
diffusion of power, and shared responsibility–all basic elements
of the new political system–to control the military. Congress,
with more direct ties to the people, was charged with raising and
equipping an army. Appropriations for the Army were limited to 2
years. The President commissioned and promoted officers, but
required Senate approval. And the Constitution mandated state
militias that were to be the firebreaks of last resort to the
power of the standing army.
In terms of assuring civilian control, these techniques
worked. Kohn writes, "The unbroken record of subordination and
loyalty by the American armed forces under the Constitution of
the United States, has been a blessing of the American political
6
system, and the envy of nations the world over." By sustaining
democracy and avoiding military intervention in politics–whether
direct or indirect–for more than 200 years, the principle of
civilian control has become an intrinsic part of American
political tradition. While this alone may not justify its
preservation, it cannot be discounted. There is inherent value in
tradition as a means of sharing values and expectations. It is
not necessary to constantly re-prove the utility of time-tested
principles, but simply to show the absence of adverse effects.
Professional officers–a group whose emergence the framers of
the Constitution did not anticipate–sometimes forget that most
Americans see a dichotomy between the military mindset and that



of the wider public. As Samuel P. Huntington, the preeminent
scholar of American civil-military relations, argues, "Military
officers are overall far more conservative in their attitudes
than other major groups in American society." More to the point,
the belief is widespread that the greater the role of military
professionals in policymaking, the greater the reliance on the
military instrument of national power. "One of the basic beliefs
of American liberalism," writes Stephen E. Ambrose, "is that
professional military men are right-wing, anxious to extend
America's overseas bases, quick to urge the use of force to
settle problems, eager to increase the size of the armed forces,
and above all powerful enough to enforce their views on the
8
government." Despite the lack of empirical verification, this
9
notion has a long tradition. Tocqueville contended that "of all
armies those which long for war most ardently are the democratic
10
ones." Charges that American foreign policy had become overmilitarized were common during the Cold War, reaching such a
crescendo during Vietnam that even career military officers
11
subscribed. One purpose of civilian control was thus "to ensure
that defense policy and the agencies of defense are subordinated
to other national traditions, values, customs, governmental
12
policies, and economic and social institutions."
Some years ago Lieutenant General Victor Krulak, when asked
to justify the existence of the United States Marines, concluded
13
that the Corps existed because the American people wanted it to.
This same logic holds for civilian control of the military. It
might be possible to show that there is no fundamental normative
difference between the military and civilians, or that civilian
leaders do not always reflect public opinion better than military
professionals. It might be possible to prove military involvement
in policymaking does not necessarily lead to a greater reliance
on the military element of national power. But so long as most
Americans believe these things and so long as the beliefs of the
American public shape national policy, then civilian control of
the military remains a vital national interest.
Dilemmas and Problems.
While diffusion of power and shared responsibility have led
to effective civilian control of the military, they have also
contributed to persistent dilemmas and problems. These cause much
of the daily tension and frustration felt by officers in the



policymaking world. One problem, for instance, is that the
specific functions of the military and civilians in the
policymaking process change over time. Civil-military relations
tend to be placid when both sides understand and accept the
distribution of responsibility for specific issues and functions.
Three things can upset this: a perception by one side that the
other is unable or unwilling to fulfill its responsibilities;
deliberate encroachment by one party on an issue or function
considered the prerogative of the other; or, the emergence of new
issues or functions not yet allocated to one party or the other.
Of these, the first is most common. For instance, the 1783
Newburgh Conspiracy was a veiled threat of an officers' revolt
14
over military pay. Pay was erratic during the Revolution and the
conspirators considered Congress unwilling or unable to make
arrears. Other crises such as Andrew Jackson's 1817 invasion of
Spanish Florida or Douglas MacArthur's conflict with President
Truman arose from the belief by military leaders that civilian
authorities did not understand the strategic situation and could
not provide cogent policy. During the late 1950s, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) frequently testified before Congress that
President Eisenhower's defense budgets reflected a
15
misunderstanding of the extent of the Soviet military threat. In
1978, Major General John Singlaub publicly denounced President
Jimmy Carter's proposal to cut forces in Korea as strategically
dangerous and irresponsible. More recently, JCS Chairman Colin
Powell assumed an active role in the formulation of post-Cold War
American strategy–and provoked charges of a crisis in civilmilitary relations–largely because the National Security Council,
Department of State, and Department of Defense were "so devoid of
16
a vision of the future international system."
Yet perceptions of inadequacy work both ways. Truman fired
MacArthur because he considered the General "without any real
appreciation of the larger political implications of the war that
17
he was fighting." In fact, "all of the post-World War II
presidents have accused the JCS of failing to fulfill its
18
responsibilities in the policy process."
President Kennedy was
so dissatisfied with the military advice he received during the
Bay of Pigs operation that he called General Maxwell Taylor–who
had earlier impressed the young Senator from Massachusetts with
his intellect and forthrightness–out of retirement to be his
19
personal advisor (and later named him Chairman of the JCS).
Lyndon Johnson was even more dismayed by what he considered a
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lack of creativity on the part of the Chiefs during Vietnam. It
was possible for presidents to limit military involvement in
policymaking during the Cold War because the rise of a community
of civilian defense experts provided a real alternative to
20
military advice. As Mark Perry points out when discussing NSC
(National Security Council) 68, one of the seminal documents
establishing U.S. strategy during the first decade of the Cold
War, "that the NSC would be assigned a leading role in writing
what was then considered a purely military assessment was a clear
signal that the opinion of the JCS was not as valued in 1950 as
21
it had been in 1940." In addition to the NSC, civilian
strategists in universities, think thanks like the RAND
Corporation, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense had no
qualms about offering guidance to policymakers on topics
previously the purview of the military. While civilians offering
strategic guidance was nothing new, what was unique was the
rigorous education and training of the Cold War generation of
strategic thinkers. This stood in contrast to the politicianscum-strategists of earlier periods.
Ironically, perceptions of inadequacy by civilians and the
military often mirror each other. The military occasionally feels
that civilian policymakers do not fully understand military
affairs or are "too political," while civilian leaders see the
military as parochial and insensitive to political
considerations. Problems can easily occur when officers believe
civilian officials are basing military decisions on electoral
politics rather than strategic necessity or the national
interest. In 1861, Major General John C. Fremont, commanding the
Western Department, declared martial law and announced the
freeing of the slaves throughout the territory despite the fact
that Lincoln, who was concerned with the support of the border
22
states, was opposed. Throughout Reconstruction, Ulysses Grant
frequently defied Andrew Johnson when he felt the President's
23
policies were mostly intended to affect party politics.
Grant
also rebuked the President before the Cabinet when Johnson
attempted to use the general's prestige to improve his prospects
24
of reelection. The JCS nearly resigned in response to Secretary
of Defense McNamara's politically-inspired "defense of a clearly
25
discredited strategy" during congressional hearings on Vietnam.
Jimmy Carter's fulfillment of a campaign pledge to cancel the B-1
bomber was "by far the most controversial defense decision he
made as president" and alienated officers who considered the
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aircraft vital for preserving nuclear deterrence. And the same
process continues: in March 1995 senior military leaders accused
the Clinton administration of "manufacturing" a military crisis
27
with Iran. The implication was that this was for political
purposes. Yet the politicization of national security is
certainly not limited to presidents. The increased role of
Congress in national security can, according to David
Hendrickson, "encourage the intrusion of narrow political
consideration into the determination of matters that ought
28
ideally to be resolved by professional experts."
Civil-military relations have also been tense when
presidents used the armed forces as a tool of social change. In
1947, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royal defied President
Harry S. Truman's order to integrate the Army. Royal based his
stance on an Army study that held that racial integration eroded
combat effectiveness. With the Secretary defending the results of
the study, uniformed officers did not have to take a visible
stand even though most opposed integration. Eventually the
29
manpower demands of the Korean War solved the issue. Similarly,
when President Clinton pledged to change the law so that
homosexuals could serve openly in the military, he struck a major
nerve.
The entry of new issues onto the security agenda also upsets
the civil-military balance. By forcing the United States to
mature as a strategic power, the Cold War sparked the most
radical restructuring of civil-military relations in American
history. From 1814 to the mid-20th century, the United States
faced no truly serious external threat. The Cold War changed
that, and gave defense issues a salience that brought intense
scrutiny. Suddenly, national security strategy was too important
to be left to generals and admirals. At the same time, the
military began to use a portion of the national income
unprecedented in peacetime, thus linking military strategy to the
30
economic health of the nation.
On a more specific level, the emergence of nuclear weapons
31
forced a re-evaluation of civil-military relations. The military
was slow to develop a clear understanding of the role of nuclear
weapons in American strategy. According to Lieutenant General
James M. Gavin, "military thinking seemed, at the outset, to be
32
paralyzed" by the challenge. Such new problems demanded a type



of creativity that was not the strong suit of military
strategists. Civilian defense experts quickly filled this
conceptual vacuum, chipping away at the prestige and prerogative
33
of the military. And competition between the military services
for control of nuclear forces sparked civil-military tension as
34
each sought political allies. At the other end of the conflict
spectrum, U.S. military involvement in counterinsurgency and
nation-building, both of which fell on the border between
traditional military and traditional civilian responsibilities,
35
also complicated civil-military relations. Official policy gave
the State Department authority for organizing and managing
36
American efforts. But military officers were often dissatisfied
with the diplomats' informal methods of problem-solving and
disdain for armed force. More recently, an article by a serving
military officer warned of the damage to civil-military relations
that could emerge from the involvement of the armed forces in
peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, counter-narcotrafficking, and
37
support to civil authorities.
Even when responsibilities are clear, problems emerge from
the different approaches to decisionmaking favored by civilian
policymakers and the military. Because the military's raison
d'etre is the organization of extensive and expensive resources
for dangerous and intricate tasks, it favors linear logic and
formal decisionmaking procedures. Within the Department of
Defense, this is codified in the Joint Strategic Planning System
38
and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. Even at
lower levels, standardized products (five paragraph operations
orders, standard operating procedures, rules of engagement,
memoranda of policy, program objective memoranda, etc.) dominate.
Everything from training schedules to doctrine has an official
method and format, all designed to maximize effectiveness and
minimize flaws. Personal relationships are structured by rank and
protocol. A glance at the shoulders or sleeves gives a reasonable
assessment of an individual's influence and importance. Despite
popular stereotypes, military thinking is not necessarily
inflexible and rigid, but it is as orderly as humanly possible.
In effect, military decisionmaking is similar to the legal
process where the existence of clear, transcendental objectives–
whether adherence to the law or attainment of the military
mission–facilitate formality and complexity in deicisionmaking.
Political decisionmaking is markedly different. Its



currencies are bargaining, compromise, and consensus-building.
Trade-offs, deals, and "backscratching" are tools of the trade.
"End runs" and emotional public appeals are acceptable.
Informality dominates. Politics assumes that individual interests
coexist with collective interests that apply to all. The
objective is an outcome where at least the key players attain
their particular interests while the group as a whole attains an
acceptable level of the collective interest. Political
decisionmaking thus seeks solutions that all can abide rather
than the "best" outcome in terms of long-range effectiveness or
efficiency. An outcome that attains short-term objectives but
alienates important constituencies is unacceptable.
Formal and informal decisionmaking are not incompatible.
Part of the genius of the American political system is that it
successfully intermingles the informality of politics with the
formality of law to spark creative tension. Similarly, an
ingrained aversion to budgetary politics does not always make the
military inept at political maneuvering. "There isn't a general
in Washington," according to General Colin Powell, "who isn't
political, not if he's going to be successful, because that's the
40
nature of our system." Or as Admiral William Crowe put it, "Few
officers these days made it into the higher ranks without a firm
grasp of international relations, congressional politics, and
41
public affairs." Yet few officers ever grow fully comfortable
with political-style decisionmaking. As Sam C. Sarkesian and John
A. Williams note, "Military professionals historically have been
suspicious of politicians and contemptuous of political activity.
Bargaining, negotiations, compromises, and consensus building
have been seen as self-serving and contrary to professional
42
principles." The inclination of those is uniform is to deny that
they seek the particular institutional interest of their service,
but to consider the service objectives as in the national
interest. The Air Force truly believes that it is in the national
interest to retain manned, fixed-wing aircraft; the Navy truly
believes the national interest demands carrier battlegroups; the
Marines truly believe that it is in the national interest to
retain amphibious warfare capability; and the Army truly believes
that it is in the national interest to have armor-heavy
divisions. The services resist thinking in terms of direct tradeoffs between major weapons systems and job training, schools,
roads, prisons, and health care. Political leaders do.



No one would argue that the U.S. military should move away
from formal, orderly thinking processes or become more overtly
political in terms of making public appeals and engaging in dealmaking. The world would be a much more dangerous place if it did.
Similarly, few would suggest that political leaders can or should
make decisions in a radically different way. In the American
political system, decisionmaking is deliberately inefficient. The
more power and authority are diffused, the harder they are to
abuse. The military must recognize this, and accept the
frustrations and inefficiencies of democratic politics. Of course
the obverse is also true: military decisionmaking is poorly
understood outside Washington. According to William Crowe, even
43
Congress does not fully grasp it.
Civilians hold even more
caricatures of the military than the military does of civilian
policymakers. The services try to ameliorate this through a range
of outreach and public education efforts, but the gap can never
44
This tension is part of the landscape of
be fully bridged.
American civil-military relations; its adverse effects can only
be minimized and controlled.
The military must also recognize that it can inadvertently
intimidate civilians. This is a common phenomenon in the world of
politics. Americans, for instance, are often perplexed when
friendly or allied nations are alarmed by U.S. influence in world
affairs. This can be called the "paradox of unintended
intimidation" as the ability to impose power receives greater
attention than statements of good intent or even benign behavior.
The same paradox applies to military involvement in policymaking.
While military leaders fully know they have no intention of
seizing power or playing a praetorian role in politics, the fact
that they could is sometimes a source of anxiety. The warfighter
ethos amplifies this distrust. The military professional is a
useful but alien being to mainstream America. He not only
dresses, talks, and behaves differently, but also seems driven by
unusual goals and values. Steps to foster communication and
understanding between military professionals and the civilian
mainstream–outreach programs, the reserve system, civilian
education for commissioned and noncommissioned officers, military
involvement in domestic disaster relief, the Army's emphasis that
it is "America's Army"–are useful, but not ultimate solutions to
the problem of unintended intimidation. Promoting the image of
obedience to civilian authorities is a never-ending task. Damage
from even murmurs of disobedience or disrespect, much less what



historian Richard Kohn depicted as the "ridicule and contempt
expressed openly" about President Clinton within the officer
45
corps, takes years to repair.
This suggests another important dilemma of American civilmilitary relations: perceptions and appearances often matter more
than reality. Formal institutional arrangements are often less
46
important than attitudes. During his initial meeting with the
JCS, Nixon's first Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, accorded
the chiefs great esteem–something McNamara had not done.
According to Mark Perry, this "stands out as the primary example
of just how a civilian leader can both dampen military mistrust
47
and gain military allegiance" by according its leaders respect.
Public appearances are also vital. When Air Force Chief of Staff
Larry Welch began espousing a plan for upgrading the ballistic
missile force somewhat at odds with the Bush administration's
position, new Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, who "understood
the symbolic importance of first impressions," publicly rebuked
48
him, leaving Welch "stunned." The general's major lapse was
forgetting the symbolic content of civil-military relations and
the frequent need for exaggerated acquiescence.
All of these dilemmas and problems are structured by the
fact that the military is the subject of civil-military relations
rather than a full partner; its role and function are largely
outside its control. As such, it can become an intentional or
unintentional pawn in political struggles among civilians. In
fact, disputes between Department of Defense civilians,
especially those pitting the Secretary of Defense and Congress,
often are cast as problems or crises of civil-military relations
49
rather than intra-civilian conflicts. Those at odds with the
military on policy issues will often blame inadequate civilian
50
control.
During the Cold War the informal alliance between the
uniformed military and congressional conservatives sometimes led
congressional liberals to complain of faltering or inadequate
civilian control of the military. The military found that it
could not participate in policymaking without charges of
partisanship. Policymaking is an inherently partisan activity; to
participate is to be political. Since disengagement or silence is
not an option for the modern military, the only solution again is
extreme, perhaps even exaggerated, reminders of nonpartisanship
and obedience to civilian authorities. For the system to function
smoothly civilian allies of the military (especially the service



secretaries) must take the lead in rebuffing charges of
inadequate civilian oversight when the roots of such charges are
actually policy differences.
American civil-military relations are built on an ingrained
asymmetry between the services, each organized as a coherent,
51
corporate body, and its civilian overseers who are not.
Civilians control the military's budget, can fire individual
military leaders, approve senior-level promotions and
assignments, and, in the case of the National Command
Authorities, can give direct orders. In addition, many civilians,
both permanent civil service and political appointees, have a
long tenure in the policymaking world while military officers
come and go. On the other hand, a well-structured career pattern
makes it easier for the military to deliberately improve the
political skill and strategic acumen of its members. Officers can
be required to study world politics and strategy before attaining
senior positions. Civilians are sometimes self-taught in the
strategic arts, often with a background in law rather than
international studies or national security affairs. As a result,
their knowledge is frequently less systematic than their military
counterparts (although not necessarily less extensive) . To some
extent, recent reform legislation widened this gap. According to
James Kitfield:
Tight ethics restrictions have discouraged good
candidates for top civilian posts at the Pentagon from
serving. And as an unintended result, the pendulum of
power over defense affairs has swung from the civilian
to the military side of the government's national
52
security apparatus.



This is an important point. Because warfighting is an
inherently chaotic activity, the military has developed an
institutional abhorrence of disorder. In policymaking, inadequate
or inconsistent attention to important problems and the absence
of logical, sequential planning procedures are considered
disorderly. Military officers thus grow frustrated by the failure
of civilians to adopt rigorous procedures for defining strategic
objectives and allocating resources and attempt to seize
functions that they perceive civilians are not performing or not
performing adequately. But the arrogation of function occurs
within narrow confines. In the broadest sense, the American
system offers several informal techniques for influencing policy:
deal-making, populism, and coalition-building. These are not
exclusive–on some issues, the military may use all three–but only
the last of these is readily available to the military. Open
deals and direct public appeals are unacceptable; the military
only turns to them as a last resort on particularly vital issues.
Officers must be willing to pay the political price when using
public fora to air dissent. When Congress was considering wideranging reform of the Department of Defense in the early 1980s,
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger expressed open displeasure
when JCS Chairman David C. Jones and Army Chief of Staff Edward
53
C. Meyer published articles supporting change. More recently,
General Colin Powell was twice the center of controversy due to
public statements seemingly at odds with official policy and for
publication of an essay in the influential journal of opinion,
Foreign Affairs. In both cases, it was less the content of
dissent than its form that mattered.



Because the military's influence over national security
policy is largely informal, its influence is directly related to
whether its recent endeavors are considered successes or
failures. Influence is thus iterative. Following perceived
failures like Vietnam or the attempted hostage rescue in Iran,
the prestige and influence of the services diminished. Since the
American military has never faced outright defeat, such declines
are usually temporary, lasting only until the next success. The
obverse is also true: after perceived successes such as Desert
Storm, the military's influence surges, but this, too, is
fleeting. This relationship of influence to perceived operational
success or failure may cause the military to become timid in its
recommendations to national policymakers. For instance, Michael
R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor suggest that Colin Powell's
highly cautious approach to the use of American military power
reflected his fear "that American public opinion could turn
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against the armed forces, as it did during the Vietnam War."
Adjustments.
American civil-military relations evolve in a distinct
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pattern.
First, changes in the domestic and international
political environments make existing attitudes and structures
obsolete. Then there is usually dramatic change, either through
galvanizing events such as Truman's firing of MacArthur and
Cheney's rebuttal of General Welch, or by key legislation such as
the National Security Act of 1947 or the Goldwater-Nichols
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Throughout the process, there
is an attempt to sustain equilibrium and balance between the
military and its civilian overseers. Today, the extent of change
in the strategic environment suggests that American civilmilitary relations are approaching disequilibrium again and major
readjustment may be imminent.
The basic nature of armed conflict, for instance, may be
shifting with conventional state-versus-state war declining in
strategic salience. Some writers predict a melding of law
enforcement and traditional military functions in response to
"gray area" threats, the privatization of security, and new forms
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of high-tech terrorism. The concept of national security may be
expanded to include protection of cyberspace, the ecology, and
public health. Future armed conflict may often involve
subnational enemies, whether ethnic militias or well-armed and



highly organized criminal gangs. As Martin van Creveld argues,
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low-intensity conflict may pose the dominant security threat. At
the same time, the ongoing "revolution in military affairs" (RMA)
might alter the nature of essential military skills, further
eroding the distinction between things military and non58
military. Prophets of the RMA predict the American military will
increasingly rely on precision, stand-off weapons and,
eventually, robots. If national security can be protected at a
computer terminal rather than on a traditional battlefield, it
may no longer make sense to have a distinct military. The crux of
civil-military relations has always been finding a way to both
preserve and control the unique skills of the warrior. If these
skills become obsolete, civil-military relations must change.
The role of military power in American national security
strategy has always shaped civil-military relations. If the
strategic role of military power changes, so, too, must civilmilitary relations. Over the next decade the United States may
militarily disengage from many parts of the world, leaving
responsibility for security to regional powers, alliance, or
international organizations. This could greatly lessen the need
for power projection and erode the rationale for military
involvement in policymaking. During the Cold War, the armed
services became major players in policymaking largely because the
military element of national power was a central component of
U.S. national security strategy. If the importance of military
power diminishes, the political influence of the armed forces
must decline. The expanded use of the U.S. military in operations
other than war, whether peacekeeping, disaster relief, ecological
clean-ups, or counter-narcotrafficking, could also have long-term
effects on civil-military relations. The military services and
civilian leaders currently agree that the primary tasks of the
armed services are to deter and win wars. But if traditional war
is replaced by conflict short of war as the preeminent security
threat faced by the United States, the military may become a
peripheral actor in policymaking. Moreover, ambiguous, protracted
military operations can erode the support and popularity that the
armed services earned in the Gulf War, thus altering the
political balance of power between the military and their
civilian overseers. Recognizing this, the military might oppose
its use in operations other than war, thus sparking a true crisis
with civilian policymakers.



The changing composition of Congress and of Executive Branch
civilians may affect relations with the military. With the end of
the draft and the shrinking of the armed forces, only a small
proportion of the American public has had military service.
Moreover, as fewer and fewer American political leaders have
military service, they may understand the military less. This gap
is enlarging. Samuel Huntington argued that the American military
is essentially and necessarily a conservative organization nested
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in a liberal society. During the Cold War, the tendency to
"rally round the flag" papered over deep differences in values
and perspectives between the military and the majority of the
American public. The end of the Cold War, in conjunction with the
ongoing socio-cultural diversification of the United States, may
further isolate the military from mainstream American culture and
affect civil-military relations.
In the past, declining defense budgets often set the
military services against one another as they competed for
resources. This made civilian control easier but eroded the
coherence of military advice to policymakers to unacceptable
levels. It is possible that "jointness"–cooperation among the
armed services–has now become so fully ingrained that they will
continue to cooperate even as budgets decline. However, the
intensity of service debate during the ongoing "roles and
missions" study suggests that under the veneer of inter-service
comity lurks the potential for conflict. If this explodes into
the open, civil-military relations will be affected as the
services scramble for allies. Similarly, changes in the defense
industrial and technological base may also change civil-military
relations. During the Cold War, defense spending affected most
parts of the United States–a fact not lost on Congress. Today,
the old military-industrial complex is greatly weakened if not
all together dead. This may lessen the military's influence in
Congress.
Some changes not designed to affect civil-military relations
end up doing so. For example, closing military bases was intended
to make the services more efficient. An unintended side effect
has been the end of military presence in many parts of the United
States. Physically, the military is abandoning locations in the
northeast and midwest and moving nearly all its resources to the
nation's southern and western littoral. This simplifies power
projection, but also means that an increasing number of



Americans–as well as their representatives in Congress–will have
little or no first-hand experience with the military. And in
response to declining resources, the armed services, particularly
the Army, are beginning to reconsider or adjust the relationship
between Active and Reserve Components. Some military leaders and
defense analysts feel that during a time of frugality for the
armed services, a large Reserve Component is a luxury. Dollar for
dollar, the argument goes, more is gained from money spent on
active forces, especially as warfare becomes increasingly complex
and crisis reaction more central to our national security
strategy. But the reserve components have long been one of the
primary connections between the military and American society.
Thus, decisions to diminish reserve forces–even if made solely on
the grounds of military effectiveness–may have unintended side
effects for civil-military relations.
Enduring Questions.
American civil-military relations exist on two distinct
levels. The first is transitory and fluid. It includes specific
issues and key individuals, each rising to prominence and then
receding. To a large extent the president is the maestro of this
ebb and flow as he shapes the policymaking process according to
his needs and proclivities. The interface between the Secretary
of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff is probably the single
most important one in American civil-military relations. The
Secretary of Defense provides the interface between civilians and
military. Whether he is seen as pro- or anti-military sets the
tenor for all of civil-military relations. The other level
consists of enduring questions–the normative base of civilmilitary relations. Here debates do not concern budgets, force
sizes, deployments, and weapons systems, but essential values.
Individuals and issues are only important to the extent they
represent enduring questions that must be re-debated and reanswered as the United States and the global security environment
changes. Two such enduring questions are particularly important.
The
increase
analysts
combined
national
military

first is whether the military should sustain or even
its role in national security policymaking. Some
feel that the military ethos of duty and devotion, when
with officers' extensive education in world affairs and
security policy, justify an expanded role for the
in policymaking. Mark Perry writes, "Is the military
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influencing our nation's foreign policy? T'wer it so." This
position assumes that civilian control is so ingrained that the
U.S. military poses no threat to democracy. It also rejects the
notion that there is a distinctly military approach to foreign
policy. It is not immediately clear, though, that the military
should want a greater role in policymaking. After all, this would
bring responsibility for the outcome of particular policies and
thus has the potential to damage the public respect that the
military worked so hard to re-earn after Vietnam. The only real
justification for a deliberate attempt to gain a greater role in
policymaking by the military would be persistent incompetence on
the part of civilian strategists and policymakers. Under such
circumstances the real solution may not be an expanded role for
the military, but some way of creating and cultivating better
civilian strategists and policymakers.
Other analysts contend that with the end of the Cold War,
the policymaking role of the U.S. military–which was temporarily
enlarged in response to a temporarily imminent security threat–
should diminish. Samuel Huntington, for instance, writes, "The
military must abandon participation in public debate about
foreign and military policy, stop building alliances amongst the
public and in Congress for defense spending–and resist the
temptation to maneuver in the bureaucracy to achieve its own
61
ends, however commendable." This is based on the assumption that
military intervention in politics remains feasible and risky. It
also assumes officers and civilians hold distinct perspectives on
national policy, and that the military one should only dominate
in times of serious threat. Such assumptions may be obsolete in
the modern world. Today the precise extent of military
involvement in policymaking is less important than the type of
individuals involved. It the military chooses senior leaders so
focused on the military element of national power that they are
unable to deal with the subtle complexity of strategy, then its
role in policymaking should be limited. If civilian participants
are more politicians than strategists, then the military–if it
generates senior leaders who are astute strategists–may have to
assume greater responsibilities.
If the military does seek an active role in national
policymaking, it must consider whether its existing procedures
produce senior leaders adept at managing civil-military
relations. According to Mark Perry, the Goldwater-Nichols Defense



Reorganization Act guaranteed the Joint Chiefs a voice in
national policymaking, but cannot ensure this advice will be
62
heeded. In terms of producing politically sensitive leaders, the
U.S. military in general and the Army in particular has exhibited
contradictory tendencies. On one hand, advanced civilian
education, often in political science or related disciplines, is
encouraged and the senior service schools (especially the
National War College) devote large portions of their curriculum
to national policymaking. On the other hand, field command is the
most important criterion for the attainment of flag rank in all
the services. To be an "intellectual" in terms of education and
publication may not be a hinderance for promotion, but it is far
less important than command of troops, airplanes, ships, or
submarines. As Henry Kissinger noted, "A man who has been used to
command finds it almost impossible to learn to negotiate, because
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negotiation is an admission of finite power."
Ongoing changes in the nature of armed conflict and national
security suggest that the military should, in fact, explicitly
develop civil-military relations skills among its leaders. The
growing importance of operations in which the military works
closely with civilian government and non-government agencies, as
well as the global publicity that accompanies military activity,
amplify this need. There is now a need for smooth civil-military
relations at the operational and tactical levels as well as the
strategic, thus changing the skills needed by even junior
officers. By contrast, the argument can be made that education
for officers in civil-military relations, constitutional law,
diplomacy, politics, and economics is a distraction from crucial
warfighting skills. In Samuel Huntington's words, "Politics is
beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of
military officers in politics undermines their professionalism,
curtailing their professional competence, dividing the profession
against itself, and substituting extraneous values for
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professional values." From this perspective, the goal for the
military should be minimally acceptable civil-military relations
skills and warfighting proficiency. This issue must be decided
within a much larger strategic framework. The key is the role of
military power within the nation's array of foreign policy tools.
If military power is to be fully and seamlessly integrated with
other elements of national power, political skill is vital for
officers at all levels. But if military power is to remain
somehow distinct from the other elements of national power, then



political skill will remain a secondary capability for
warfighters, necessary only at the highest levels.
The second enduring issue concerns the ultimate loyalty of
officers within the framework of civilian control. Clearly this
loyalty should lie somewhere outside officers' individual desires
or even the good of their service. Transcendental allegiance is,
after all, one thing that distinguishes militaries like the
American from the coup-prone, corrupt, and politicized
institutions found in some parts of the Third World. The question
is whether ultimate loyalty resides with the commander-in-chief,
the national interest, or the Constitution. Most of the time,
there is no divergence or incompatibility between the three.
Legally and ethically, ultimate loyalty should lie with the
Constitution. A member of the U.S. military swears allegiance to
the Constitution, not the commander-in-chief. But while this
concept is clear, reality is not so neat. Peter Feaver contends
the Truman-MacArthur dispute was based on the general's "novel
and dangerous interpretation of civil-military relations" in
which an officer could ignore the president in the name of the
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national interest. And, in what could have been one of the most
difficult decisions ever faced by American military leaders,
there were rumors that President Nixon considered declaring
emergency powers and using the armed forces to prevent his
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removal from office by Congress. What, then, should an officer
do when convinced that the president or official policy is wrong?
One alternative is what Lenin called "democratic
centralism." This holds that an officer may dissent in private
or even openly while a policy is being formulated, but once a
decision is made, he must adhere. However sound in principle,
this has at least two problems. First, the American system
sometimes makes it difficult to know exactly when official policy
has been promulgated or what that policy is. Policy is not law.
Presidents and civilian policymakers sometimes choose to leave it
vague in order to retain flexibility or deflect opposition.
Second, slavish adherence to official policy by the military can
erode an important corrective to misguided policy. If the Joint
Chiefs had been more prone to question Lyndon Johnson's strategy,
American involvement in Vietnam might have ended differently. A
military willing to obey and apply badly flawed policies, in
other words, can be as dangerous as one seeking to wrest control
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of policymaking from civilian officials. As former Secretary of



Defense James Schlesinger told Dick Cheney, "After a lifetime of
taking orders, generals and admirals were, if anything, too
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compliant." There is then, a tender and complex balance between
too much autonomy and too little.
Another approach is to distinguish the president (or the
presidency) from his policies. This allows an officer to actively
support the commander-in-chief even while opposing policy
considered wrong or misguided. At its simplest, it entails saying
"I think this order is blatantly stupid, but I will implement
it." But if dissent is allowed, what means are acceptable? One
answer is that only private disagreement with existing policy is
permitted if the officer intends to continue service. In extreme
cases of dissent, public resignation is acceptable. Another
answer holds that under some circumstances, the military should
and must publicly air its disagreement with official policy in
order to inform debate. Smooth civil-military relations,
according to this line of reasoning, are not always desirable–
sometimes creative tension is needed. During the implementation
of the "New Look" strategy during the Eisenhower administration,
the Chiefs often took issue with official policy during
congressional testimony (despite Eisenhower's displeasure), but
did not take their case to the public or resign in protest (even
though they considered it). More recently, senior military
leaders have taken issue with official policy in even more open
fora such as interviews and publications. Occasionally this was
punished and at other times accepted, thus showing that the
parameters of acceptable dissent are not immutable. As a general
rule, disagreement with Congress and even official military
policy is tolerated to a greater extent than disagreement with
the President or Secretary of Defense.
The final approach–and the most dangerous one–holds that an
officer's loyalty is not to the president or even the presidency,
but to the Constitution or the national interest as he defines
it. This, of course, was MacArthur's position. The pitfalls are
obvious. To make it work, officers must be experts on
constitutional law and the national interest. "If each
professional military officer were to defend the constitution as
he interpreted it individually without reference to the
administration in power," Donald Bletz writes, "the American
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democratic system would be unworkable." This approach could also
pave the way toward military intervention in politics. Many Third



World coups are led by officers who claim to understand the
national interest better than civilian politicians, and who feel
that seizure of power by the military is the only way to save the
nation. Moreover, the advent of nuclear weapons, which accorded
military issues an unprecedented importance and immediacy, made
autonomous decisions by officers all the more dangerous. Still,
the right of an officer to appeal to higher loyalties must not be
rejected a priori. There is always the possibility of an
emergency so dire or a president so misguided that a dedicated
officer must be willing to defy the commander-in-chief, all the
while willing to pay the personal price this will entail.
Conclusions.
As with so many political and strategic issues, the future
of American civil-military relations can be distilled to
assumptions. Most Americans agree that the objective is a
competent, professional military able to contribute to national
security policymaking but not dominate it, but there is no
consensus on the changes that the evolution of the global
security environment (including the concept of national security)
will bring, or on the risks of too much military involvement in
policymaking. Like all assumptions, these must be periodically
reexamined and debated in order to preserve a working consensus.
Future historians will consider the Cold War a seminal event
in the evolution of American civil-military relations. Today,
policymakers and students of national security affairs can sense
the extent of change it will require, but do not yet understand
the specifics. Many of the perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes
that shaped American national security policy during the Cold War
still linger–we are in the "post-Cold War" security era, awaiting
the birth of a new one. The issues that will shape the future
such as the changing nature of armed conflict and alterations in
U.S. national security strategy are clear, but their precise
impact on civil-military relations is not. The best analysts can
do at this time is illuminate the debate, point out the central
determinants of future problems, and explain the complex
relationship between new issues and perennial problems. Doing
this suggests that if there is to be a crisis in American civilmilitary relations, it is not occurring now, but will happen in a
decade or so when the psychological legacy of the Cold War fully
fades and fundamental assumptions are again open to debate. The



changes undergone by American civil-military relations in the
last decades of the 20th century will thus pale in comparison to
those of the first few decades of the 21st century.
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